ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING: WHO
DETERMINES THE VALUE OF OTHER LIFE?
FRANCISCO BENZONI †
I. STANDING AND VALUE
The constitutional requirements for standing articulated by the
Supreme Court impose a fiercely contested theory of value on the
democratic polity. These requirements (of injury-in-fact, causation,
and redressability) are threshold requirements that must be met by
the human plaintiff in order for a federal court to hear the case.
Because they are constitutional in nature, these requirements trump
any statutory grant of standing to citizens to stand in for ecosystems
or other life that is injured by activities that are statutorily prohibited.
For instance, a statute (such as the Endangered Species Act) may
grant protection to a given species and grant citizens’ standing to sue
to enforce these protections. Nevertheless, the courts cannot hear a
case brought by a citizen in which such a species is injured by
activities alleged to be prohibited unless the human plaintiff can show
that he or she was also injured by those activities. Further, the injury
must be shown to be caused by the activity in question and the
plaintiff must show that the injury would be likely to be redressed if
1
the activity was stopped.
Such requirements, at least in those cases where the agency with
enforcement power fails to act, effectively remove other life or
ecosystems from any direct claim to justice in our legal system. A
claim to justice is premised at least in part on the value of the parties.
Therefore, the constitutional standing doctrine amounts to a judicial

† Visiting Assistant Professor, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University; J.D. 2008,
Duke University School of Law; Ph.D. 2003, University of Chicago Divinity School.
1. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (holding that when “a
plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of
regulation) of someone else . . . it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing
that [the] choices [of that third party] have been or will be made in such manner as to produce
causation and permit redressability of injury”).
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imposition of a theory of value in which human beings are the source
2
and center of value.
The scope of citizens’ suit provisions in environmental
regulations have been significantly curtailed by the standing doctrine,
with its constitutional requirements that the plaintiff show injury-in3
fact, causation, and redressability.
Ironically, the most basic
rationale for the standing doctrine is the separation of powers
4
between the branches of the federal government. The Supreme
Court explained that standing “is founded in concern about the

2. This judicial imposition of a human-centered value system is well-illustrated in an en
banc case from the D.C. Circuit, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426
(1998). In that case, Marc Jurnove, an individual who was trained in the care of animals and
highly concerned about their welfare, contended that a number of animals at the Long Island
Game Farm Park and Zoo were being treated unlawfully under the Animal Welfare Act
(AWA). Id. at 428. (Note that the Animal Welfare Act does not have a citizens’ suit provision,
so this suit was brought under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). But the
constitutional standing analysis, our concern here, is identical either way.) Jurnove specifically
challenged then-current USDA regulations that allegedly permitted the conditions of which he
complained. Id. at 430. But, in order to have standing to bring suit, Jurnove could not argue on
the basis of the injurious treatment to the animals – the object of his concern – even though that
treatment was allegedly illegal under the AWA. Neither could he argue that he suffered a
moral or ethical injury by the treatment, since the courts have not recognized such an injury
(and it would probably come too close to “ideological injury” for the courts). Therefore,
Jurnove had to establish that he suffered “aesthetic injury” by the mistreatment of these
animals. Id. at 428-29, 434. The majority of the court found that injury-in-fact was established
by Jurnove’s aesthetic injury. Id. at 429. But there is something troubling, even offensive, about
this finding. It diverts attention from Jurnove’s concern, from the concern about the well-being
of other life, to Jurnove’s well-being. And the court orders a remedy, not to heal the injury to
the animals, but in order that Jurnove’s aesthetic tastes will no longer receive offense by the way
these animals are treated. Like the citizens’ suit provisions of environmental statutes, the
court’s inquiry should focus on whether the APA, together with the relevant agency action, give
Jurnove a cause of action. The court’s focus on injury-in-fact is muddled, inconsistent, and
offensive to those who do not adhere to the implied theory of value.
3. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
4. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 752 (1984); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). The
Supreme Court has also justified standing requirements on several additional bases. Standing
serves judicial efficiency since it holds back the floodgates against those who have only an
ideological, rather than a personal, particularized, stake in the outcome of the suit. See, e.g.,
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (Powell, J., concurring). Further, standing is
purported to ensure that individuals raise only their own rights and do not intermeddle with the
rights of others – seeking to protect what the other does not want protected. See, e.g., Singleton
v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976). Finally, the standing requirement is purported to sharpen
and focus judicial decision-making. As the Court put it in Baker v. Carr, standing requires a
plaintiff to allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (cited in
Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007)).
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proper – and properly limited – role of the courts in a democratic
5
By requiring that plaintiffs meet the requirements of
society.”
standing, the Court arguably confines its own activity to justiciable
cases and controversies and so keeps the Court out of the policymaking arena properly conferred on the elected branches of
government. These requirements are also purported to prevent the
other branches from infringing on each others’ constitutionally
delegated powers; in particular, they prevent Congress from
delegating to the courts the executive task of carrying out legislative
6
mandates or enforcing the law.
In the context of environmental regulations (such as the
Endangered Species Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water
Act) that protect, at least in part, ecosystems and other life, citizens’
suit provisions allow for individuals to meet statutory standing
requirements by suing on account of injury to ecosystems or other
life. The Court, however, has explicitly rejected this construal as
failing to meet the constitutional requirements for Article III
standing. In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
7
Services (TOC), Inc., the Court explained, “[t]he relevant showing
for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not injury to the
8
environment but injury to the plaintiff.” Even if the relevant statute
prohibits activity that results in injury to a river, a species, or an
ecosystem, the courts will only hear the case if the human plaintiff can
demonstrate that she has suffered a particularized, concrete injury (or
injury-in-fact) as a result of (i.e. causation) the prohibited activity.
Further, it is the injury to the human plaintiff that must be likely to be
redressed by a favorable ruling.
The standing doctrine, then, has the odd effect of placing the
human plaintiff before the court, with the injury to the ecosystem or
other life that is prohibited by the relevant statute as relevant only to
the extent this environmental injury also injures the human plaintiff
and to the extent that healing this environmental injury redresses the
injury to human plaintiff. The ecosystem and other life, in other
words, become a backdrop for the human drama of injury and
healing. To be sure, many interpretations of the constitutional
provisions involve value judgments. However, by separating human

5.
6.
7.
8.

Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.
528 U.S. 167 (2000).
Id. at 181.

350

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 18:347

beings from the rest of nature, the current standing doctrine stands
out for its wholesale imposition of a thoroughgoing and powerfully
contested theory of value. And since it is on such values that a
democratic polity adopts policies for how we structure our lives
together, the assumption of any such value theory is best left to the
elected branches of government.
This standing doctrine has deep ethical significance. It is usually
considered a matter of justice that those injured by legally cognizable
wrongs have recourse to the courts to be made whole. The Court’s
use of the standing doctrine effectively removes ecosystems and other
9
life from any direct claim to justice. This amounts to the judicial
institutionalization of a theory of value in which human beings are the
source and center of value. The problem is not so much whether such
a value theory is tenable. Rather, the problem is that by imposing a
particular theory of value on a democratic polity, the Supreme Court
(on almost any account of the Courts’ role) has transgressed its
proper boundaries and usurped a legislative, and properly
democratic, function. It is part of the function of the legislature, in
free and open debate, to determine the principles of justice, and the
theory (or theories) of value, that order our lives together.
The effects of the Court’s position are not simply theoretical. On
the contrary, if courts hold that there is no injury in the destruction of
other life or of an ecosystem, absent direct injury to human beings, it
is difficult to muster the resources and commitments necessary to
actively protect against such “environmental” injury. The current
standing doctrine also forces environmentalists to couch their claims
in terms of human self-interest. More than thirty years ago, Laurence
Tribe pointed out the danger of this approach: “What the
environmentalist may not perceive is that, by couching his claim in
terms of human self-interest – by articulating environmental goals
wholly in terms of human needs and preferences – he may be helping
to legitimate a system of discourse which so structures human thought
and feeling as to erode, over the long run, the very sense of obligation
10
which provided the impetus for his own protective efforts.” This
yields what Tribe calls a “metamorphosis of obligation into self11
interest and personal preference.” Tribe’s point, in part, is that the
way we speak influences the way we think. Couching arguments in
9. As noted, this is at least true where the relevant agency fails to act.
10. Laurence Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for
Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1330-31 (1974).
11. Id. at 1331.
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terms of human preferences, as the standing doctrine forces us to do,
can erode the very values that bring us to feel an obligation to
ecosystems and other life. Even when one’s concern with injury to
other life is ethical, to be legally cognizable it must be put in terms of
human injury, such as a recreational injury or an aesthetic injury,
which fundamentally distorts the ethical dimension of the
experienced reality.
In this paper, I begin with an articulation of the development of
the current standing doctrine. I then argue that this doctrine is
logically untenable, constitutionally unsupported, and undermined by
our legal history.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT STANDING DOCTRINE
Historically, the right to bring suit had been closely tied to
recognized common-law injuries arising from contract disputes,
property disputes, or tort. The early, embryonic form of standing as a
distinct doctrine occurred during the 1920s and 1930s, against the
background of a heated debate about the constitutionality of the
12
administrative state, with its myriad regulations. Justices Brandeis
and Frankfurter, with their overlapping tenures, led the Court in the
development of this doctrine. Their goal was to limit an aggressive
judicial attack on progressive and New Deal legislation by erecting
13
procedural barriers to such attacks.
The Supreme Court first articulated the bar to citizen and
taxpayer standing during these years. For instance, in 1923, in
Frothingham v. Mellon, the plaintiff sued, as a taxpayer, to restrain
federal expenditures under the Maternity Act of 1921, an Act
14
The plaintiff
intended to reduce infant and maternal mortality.
claimed that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment. The Court
denied standing, holding that the plaintiff alleged no injury to a legal
right beyond suffering in an indefinite way in common with people
generally. The Court held,

12. Perhaps ironically, the Justices who now seek to rein in citizens’ suits that challenge
agency actions are viewed by many as too friendly to industry. But they find themselves, to
some degree, in alignment with earlier Justices who developed the standing doctrine to protect
agency decisions from attack or interference by industry.
13. See, e.g., Robert Pushaw, Jr. Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 396 (1996) (arguing that Justice Frankfurter played a
central role in designing the standing doctrine).
14. 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923).
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We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on
the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be
considered only when the justification for some direct injury
suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest
upon such an act. Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining
and declaring the law applicable to the controversy. It amounts to
little more than the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional
enactment, which otherwise would stand in the way of the
enforcement of a legal right. The party who invokes the power
must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that he
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
15
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.

If someone (1) has a legal right, (2) is in danger of sustaining, or
has sustained, an injury to that right by the enforcement of a statute,
and (3) the individual alleges that the statute is invalid, then (4) that
16
individual has standing to sue. The Court in this case did not link
these requirements to Article III; rather, they followed the line from
common law demanding a cause of action or a legal right that has
been or will be violated, with the additional concern of “generalized
grievances,” that accompanied the rise of the administrative state.
The plaintiff needs to show an injury beyond the claim of some
17
Taxpayers, in
indefinite suffering shared by all the population.
general, do not have standing to sue to challenge federal expenditures
because their interests are comparatively minute and their purported
18
injury is shared by the general population. Similarly, in 1937, the
Court ruled that a plaintiff could not gain standing merely from the
19
claim that he had a right to have the government follow the laws.
“[I]t is not sufficient [for standing],” the Court held, “that he has

15. Id. at 488. In a companion case disposed at the same time the Court denied the State of
Massachusetts standing to challenge the same Act. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488
(1923) (holding that the plaintiff “must be able to show . . . that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of [the] enforcement [of the
challenged statute], and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with
people generally”).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 487-88.
18. Id. at 487.
19. Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). The early standing guidelines hewed roughly to
preexisting law. For instance, in Tenn Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137
(1939), the Court held that unless a plaintiff had “a legal right, —one of property, one arising
out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which
confers a privilege,” there was no cause of action. (quoted by Laveta Casdorph, The
Constitution and Reconstitution of the Standing Doctrine, 30 ST. MARY’S L. J. 471, 488 (1998)).
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20

merely a general interest common to all members of the public.”
Frothingham and Leavitt establish the bar to taxpayer and citizen
standing. But they do not hold that these are Article III requirements
and they do not address the situation where there is a statutory grant
of standing, leaving open the possibility that Congress could override
these decisions for particular purposes in a given statute.
It was not until 1944 in Stark v. Wickard that the Court made its
21
first reference to standing as an Article III limitation. The next case
that made a similar reference did not come until 1952 in Adler V.
22
Board of Education. In that case, an employee of the New York
City Board of Education brought a suit seeking a determination that
a New York law was unconstitutional, and seeking to enjoin the
Board of Education from implementing it. The majority found no
23
constitutional infirmity in the statute.
Justice Frankfurter, in his
dissenting opinion, argued that “we should adhere to the teaching of
this Court’s history to avoid constitutional adjudications on merely
abstract or speculative issues and to base them on the concreteness
afforded by an actual, present, defined controversy, appropriate for
24
judicial judgment, between adversaries immediately affected by it.”
He argued that the jurisdiction of the Court was limited “by the
settled construction of Article III of the Constitution. We cannot
entertain, as we again recognize this very day, a constitutional claim
at the instance [sic] of one whose interest has no material significance
25
and is undifferentiated from the mass of his fellow citizens.”
Apparently, by that date, at least in the mind of Justice Frankfurter,
the plaintiff’s interest must be materially significant and differentiated
from a generalized grievance to meet the constitutional requirements
26
for standing. Though now elevated to constitutional requirements,
this position is consistent with the claim that standing is conferred so

20. 302 U.S. at 634.
21. 321 U.S. 288, 310-11 (1944) (“[U]nder Article III, Congress established courts to
adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of infringement of individual rights . . . We
merely determine the petitioners have shown a right to a judicial examination of their
complaint.”) (cited by Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan? of Citizen Suits,
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L REV. 163, 169 (1992)).
22. 342 U.S. 485, 501 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 496.
24. Id. at 497-498.
25. Id. at 501 (emphases added).
26. Note that, in Adler v. Board of Education, as in Stark v. Wickard, the claims concerning
the lack of material interest or significance largely overlapped with the lack of differentiation
from the larger public or the generalized nature of the claim.
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long as the law – either common law or statute – has conferred upon
the plaintiff a cause of action, giving her the required interest.
By the mid-1950s, the focus of the Court had “shifted from
27
regulatory to civil rights issues.” As the Warren Court expanded
individual rights and sought a constitutional grounding for them, the
Court liberally interpreted statutes to expand the doctrine of
28
standing. In 1968, the Court dramatically broadened access to the
29
courts to challenge government action. In Flast v. Cohen, the Court
upheld taxpayer standing to challenge federal expenditures that went
to parochial schools as violating the Establishment Clause. Both the
majority and the dissent agreed that the rule preventing the Court
from hearing generalized grievances was prudential rather than
30
constitutional. The majority distinguished Frothingham by arguing
that the First Amendment, but not the Tenth Amendment (which was
at issue in Frothingham), was a limit on the taxing and spending
31
authority of Congress. The Court held that “in terms of Article III
limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is
related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
32
capable of judicial resolution.”
The Court’s emphasis in this
standing decision was on “adverseness” rather than “separation of
powers.” However, the standard articulated such a high level of
generality that probably most disputes could be described as
“adverse” and whether the form was one “historically capable of
judicial resolution” provided little guidance. The Burger Court
subsequently moved essentially to limit Flast to the facts of the case
33
rather than allowing broad-based taxpayer standing.
The insistence that Article III requires injury-in-fact, causation,
and redressability was not a part of the judicial landscape until the

27. Casdorph, supra note 19, at 489.
28. Id. at 489-91.
29. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
30. Id. at 101, 119-20 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 105.
32. Id. at 101.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (holding that the
plaintiff lacked standing to challenge statutes providing secrecy for the CIA’s budget as
violating the Constitution’s requirement of regular accounting for all expenditures because he
was not suing on the basis of a personal right, but only as a citizen and taxpayer with a
generalized grievance). The Court deemed it irrelevant that the plaintiff claimed that if he
could not sue, no one could. Id. at 179.
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34

1970s. In 1970, two events took place that, at the time, seemed to
have little to do with each other: (1) the Clean Air Act amendments
introduced citizen enforcement suits into environmental statutory
35
law, and (2) the Supreme Court, in two opinions by Justice Douglas
handed down on the same day, introduced “injury-in-fact” into
36
standing jurisprudence.
Virtually every piece of environmental
legislation that followed the Clean Air Act, including the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, included a citizens’ suit provision to compel
agency action to comply with the law and to allow citizens’
37
enforcement actions against private individuals. Through the 1970s,
the standing doctrine grew alongside the citizens’ suit provision.
Originally intended to continue the process of broadening
plaintiffs’ access to the courts, the Supreme Court’s 1970 decision in
38
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp
ironically provided the framework for the most restrictive
39
requirements in the (comparatively brief) history of the doctrine.
The petitioners in Data Processing, who sold computer services to
businesses, challenged a ruling of the Comptroller of Currency that
allowed banks to make available data processing services to
40
customers and other banks. The lower court had dismissed the case,
41
holding that the plaintiff lacked standing. In reversing the lower
court, the Supreme Court argued, “[w]here statutes are concerned,
the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who may
protest administrative action. The whole drive for enlarging the
42
category of aggrieved ‘persons’ is symptomatic of that trend.”

34. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 168.
35. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1706 (1970).
36. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
37. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(a) (2002); Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1) (2006); Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(1) (2006); Clean Water Act of 1976, 33 U.S.C. §
1365 (2006); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1)
(2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300j-8 (2006); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6972 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006 and Supp. 1990); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2006);
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006); Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety
Act of 1979, 49 U.S.C. § 60121 (2006); and others.
38. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
39. Casdorph, supra note 19, at 492-93.
40. 397 U.S. at 151.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 154.
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To facilitate this trend, the Court separated the issue of standing
43
from the “legal interest” test which, it held, went to the merits. For
the issue of standing, the Court held, “[t]he first question is whether
the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury
44
in fact, economic or otherwise.” Instead of examining the governing
law to see if Congress had created a legal interest, the Court would
perform an independent standing inquiry that would turn on the facts
rather than the law. Since Data Processing, injury-in-fact has been
taken as one of the three constitutional requirements for meeting the
Article III standard for cases or controversies. The question of
whether the plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact was separated from
the merits of the case and determined before the court got to the
merits. It is a threshold matter that the courts must resolve to hear
the case.
The next major development in the standing doctrine came in
45
1975. In Warth v. Seldin, four classes of plaintiffs challenged the
zoning ordinances of Pensfield, New York, that they claimed
excluded low- and moderate-income housing. The Court denied
standing to all four classes because, the Court held, they were unable
to establish a nexus between the ordinance and their claimed injury;
that is, the plaintiffs failed to show that, absent the ordinances, they
would have been able to afford housing in Penfield. The Court never
reached the merits of the case because the majority held that the
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the
ordinance and the claimed injury. The Court stated, “The Art. III
judicial power exists only to redress [redressability] or otherwise to
protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the
court’s judgment may benefit others collaterally. A federal court’s
jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself
has suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from
46
Since then, the three
[causation] the putatively illegal action.”

43. Id. at 153.
44. Id. at 152. This case also first articulated the “zone of interest” test as a prudential
standing requirement for cases brought under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See
Casdorph, supra note 19, at 493-94. Since this paper’s focus is on (1) citizens’ suits (which make
the Administrative Procedures Act unnecessary for bringing a suit) and (2) the constitutional
requirements for standing, we will not explore this aspect of the case.
45. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
46. Id. at 499 (emphases added) (citations and quotations omitted). See also Simon v. E.
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41-42 (1976) (holding that, as a constitutional matter,
the claimed injury must be one that “fairly can be traced” to the defendant’s actions and that
the injury is likely to be “redressed by a favorable decision”).
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constitutional requirements to meet Article III standing have been
47
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.
In 1992, the citizens’ suit provisions of environmental statutes
and the (now) constitutional requirements of standing clashed
48
dramatically in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. Nine years earlier, in
1983, then-Judge Antonin Scalia of the U.S. Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia, published an article, “The Doctrine of Standing
49
as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,” whose
reasoning would become that of the Supreme Court in Lujan. Judge
Scalia stated that his “thesis is that the judicial doctrine of standing is
a crucial and inseparable element of . . . [the] principle [of separation
of powers], whose disregard will inevitably produce – as it has during
the past few decades – an overjudicialization of the processes of selfgovernance. More specifically, I suggest that courts need to accord
greater weight than they have in recent times to the traditional
requirement that the plaintiff’s alleged injury be a particularized one,
50
which sets him apart from the citizenry at large.” In Lujan, Justice
Scalia, writing for the Supreme Court, echoed this reasoning. The
Interior Department had promulgated a regulation that required
consultation only for actions taken in the United States or on the high
seas, exempting from the Endangered Species Act actions by U.S.
government taken overseas. The plaintiffs in Lujan claimed that the
U.S. government funded activities abroad which would increase the
rate of extinction of threatened or endangered species, so that the
regulation at issue was against the provisions of the Endangered
Species Act. Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion, noted that the
first constitutional requirement of standing is that “the plaintiff must
have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact’ – an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or
51
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” He added in a footnote
that the injury, to be particularized, “must affect the plaintiff in a
52
personal and individual way.”
When the plaintiff is herself the object of an action, this will
generally not be a hurdle. But when “a plaintiff’s asserted injury

47. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99.
48. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
49. Scalia, supra note 4.
50. Id. at 881-82.
51. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990))
(internal quotations omitted).
52. Id. at 560, n.1.
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arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of
53
regulation) of someone else, much more is needed.” In Lujan, the
plaintiffs’ claim to injury was that two of the plaintiffs had traveled to
foreign countries and observed endangered animals in their native
habitat, and these animals were now threatened with extinction by
54
the action of the U.S. government. Both plaintiffs claimed that they
intended to go back and would be harmed if the animals were to
become extinct. The Court ruled that the plaintiffs had not shown
how damage to the animals would produce any imminent injury to the
plaintiffs since they did not have any definite, concrete plans to
55
return. The Court held that the injury-in-fact requirement of Article
III standing invalidated the explicit congressional grant of standing to
citizens in the Endangered Species Act (and presumably in other
environmental statutes). Congress can create statutory standing only
if there is also injury-in-fact. The Court noted that it does not make
any difference that the Endangered Species Act was intended, in part,
to provide a means by which to preserve ecosystems on which
56
endangered or threatened species depend.
“To say that the Act
protects ecosystems is not to say that the Act creates (if it were
possible) rights of action in persons who have not been injured in fact,
that is, persons who use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly
57
affected by the unlawful action in question.”
The Court explicitly rejected citizens’ suit provisions, common to
environmental statutes, as a means of gaining standing:
Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of
Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in
our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the
separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch . . .
‘The province of the court,’ as Chief Justice Marshall said in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 170, 2 L. Ed. 60
53. Id. at 562. As Judge Scalia had put it nine years earlier, “when an individual who is the
very object of a law’s requirement or prohibition seeks to challenge it, he always has
standing. . . . Contrast that classic form of court challenge with the increasingly frequent
administrative law cases in which the plaintiff is complaining of an agency’s unlawful failure to
impose a requirement or prohibition upon someone else.” Scalia, supra note 4, at 894.
54. 504 U.S. at 562-64.
55. Id. at 564. As the dissent points out, this requirement is likely an “empty formality”
since it could be satisfied by the simple expedient of purchasing plane tickets to the designated
locations. Id. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. Through its standing jurisprudence, then, the Court has effectively imposed an
anthropocentric value theory through its doctrine of standing. Persons, not ecosystems, must be
injured in order to have standing to sue on behalf of ecosystems whose health the relevant law is
intended to protect.
57. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565.
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(1803), ‘is, solely, to decide the rights of individuals.’ Vindicating
the public interest (including the public interest in Government
observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of
Congress and the Chief Executive. The question presented here is
whether the public interest in proper administration of the laws
(specifically, in agencies’ observance of a particular, statutorily
prescribed procedure) can be converted into an individual right by
a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens
(or, for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive
concrete harm) to sue. If the concrete injury requirement has the
separation-of-powers significance we have always said, the answer
must be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance
with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to
permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care
58
that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ Art. II, § 3.

Congress, the Court held, cannot convert the public interest in
the proper administration of laws into an individual right that permits
all individuals to sue. Article III standing requirements, and
especially the requirement of “injury-in-fact,” prohibit this conversion
because it would violate the separation of powers and make the
59
courts “monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”
Though the Court in subsequent decisions has backpedaled from
the stringent application of the “concrete injury” requirement for
standing, in what one commentator has called a move from “injury60
in-fact” to “injury-in-fiction,” it remains confined to the boundaries
it set for itself in the three constitutional requirements for standing –
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. This confinement is
reflected in recent decision, Massachusetts v. EPA, where both the
majority and the dissent argue within these boundaries. The
disagreement among the Justices stems from their differing
interpretation of how stringently to apply these terms. The Court
uses its test for standing to determine the constitutionality of the

58. Id. at 576-77. Steven L. Winter has aptly called this Scalia’s “imperial vision of the law”
in which the citizens and ostensible rulers are left as passive and alienated subjects, with the
imperial executive having not just the power to enforce the law, but the exclusive power for such
enforcement. Steven L. Winter, What if Justice Scalia Took History and the Rule of Law
Seriously? 12 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 155, 163 (1993). Winter points out several other
problems with Scalia’s argument, such as its tension with the very notion of “rule of law.” Id. at
166.
59. 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984).
60. Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizens Suits, Standing, and Environmental
Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 55 (2001).
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congressional grant of standing. Prior to Lujan, where it could be
discerned, the Court had deferred to congressional intent with regard
61
to the grant of standing. Lujan, then, seemingly casts the Court’s
prior reasoning into doubt.
III. STANDING AS A NORMATIVE INQUIRY
These holdings set the stage for the Court’s decision in Lujan,
with its stringent articulation of the injury-in-fact test, examined
above. The Court in Lujan, recall, held that the injury-in-fact
requirement demanded a showing that the injury affected the plaintiff
62
in a “personal and individual way,”
was “concrete and
particularized,” “actual or imminent,” “not conjectural or
63
hypothetical.” This stringent test made a finding of “as applied”
unconstitutionally of citizens’ suit in environmental statutes
practically a foregone conclusion – as Justice Scalia intended. Such
suits could be successful only if the plaintiff could also meet these
64
stringent Article III requirements.
65
Because standing is a threshold question, the courts must make
the
determination
concerning
these
three
requirements
independently of the governing law and before turning to the merits
of the case. If the Article III standing requirements were determined
on the basis of the governing law, then the court would simply ask if

61. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1179 (1992). For further support of
this thesis, see also Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345-48, 352-53 (1984); Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-81 (1978); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210-12
(1972); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 155-56 (1970); Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473-76 (1940).
62. 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.
63. 504 U.S. at 560.
64. But what is the source of these requirements, and, in particular, of the injury-in-fact
requirement? The short answer is that the Court invented them. But they may have been led
down that path by a mistaken interpretation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by
Kenneth Culp Davis. 3 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.02, at 21113 (1958). See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 186.
Note that the Court in Data Processing was interpreting the APA. But interestingly, the
opinion is actually unclear on whether the injury-in-fact test was meant to apply to the Court’s
interpretation of the APA or to Article III standing. Subsequent decisions, of course, have
interpreted it as an Article III requirement. In 1958, Davis misread the words “adversely
affected or aggrieved” (and so having standing to challenge an agency decision) in the APA to
mean injury “in fact.” But the words are not freestanding; they are followed by “within the
meaning of a relevant statute.” See APA, § I.C.
65. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
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the plaintiff had a cause of action grounded in a legal source, either
common law or statutory law. If there was such a cause of action, the
“case” or “controversy” requirement of Article III would be met.
Where such a cause of action was missing, the case would be
dismissed for lack of standing.
But the Supreme Court has set Article III standing requirements
as a threshold question, and divorced the inquiry into injury-in-fact
66
(as well as causation and redressability) from legal interest. The
Court in Data Processing sought to move from a complex legal
inquiry to a purely fact-based inquiry of whether there was a factual
67
But this separation is untenable. It is inevitable, indeed
harm.
logically necessary, that we rely on some standard to distinguish
between what counts as an injury and what does not. This is a valueladen, normative inquiry. To be sure, this notion is partially obscured
by the fact that in many cases there are fairly well-established
conventions on what counts as an injury. In enacting statutes,
legislatures often make value determinations or normative decisions
about what ought to count as an injury, what sorts of harms ought to
be redressable in the courts. Likewise, with the common law, judges
make these determinations, often appealing to such norms as equity
or justice.
The question of what is an injury is a normative inquiry because
it depends upon an individual’s understanding of the way something
ought to be and ought to function (how, say, a human body ought to
exist and function, or the way tree or ecosystem ought to exist and
function, etc.). Such an understanding depends deeply on what we
believe the purpose of such entities are (e.g., does an ecosystem exist,
finally, for the human good? Or does it have a broader purpose or
purposes, quite independent of the human good?). An injury to an
entity, then, is a deviation, or a pathology, from the way that entity
ought to exist or function (i.e., a deviation from our normative
vision). This is essentially a metaphysical inquiry, and far from being
value-free, it implicates the deepest of our values. Even if we restrict
ourselves to human beings, what is an injury is far from clear. Does
someone who fears that the river is polluted in the absence of any
scientific evidence suffer a concrete, factual injury? Does someone
66. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
67. Id. See also, Sunstein, supra note 21, at 188 (arguing that “[t]he Data Processing Court
appears to have thought that it was greatly simplifying matters by shifting from a complex
inquiry of law (is there a legal injury?) to an exceedingly simple, law-free inquiry into fact (is
there a factual harm?)”).
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who finds deeply offensive, and so offers a legal challenge to, the
grant of tax deductions to racially segregated schools suffer a
concrete, factual injury? Does an individual who feels deep sorrow
over the threatened loss of a species suffer a concrete, factual injury?
Does someone who cares deeply about animals, upon seeing them
treated cruelly, suffer a concrete, factual injury? The Supreme Court
has answered these questions in various ways because the injury-infact standard cannot not actually provide guidance as between people
with differing normative worldviews. By stripping “injury” from its
legal grounding, the Supreme Court has unmoored the term from any
common reference point. That is, how individuals answer the
question “what is an injury in fact?” implicates their normative vision
of reality; the term “injury” becomes highly mutable because it is a
depository that refracts these differing worldviews.
To be sure, the underlying logic of Lujan, with its three
constitutional requirements for Article III standing, remains the law
of the land. And these requirements were reinforced by several cases
68
However, the Court has not consistently
that came after Lujan.
followed
the
stringent
version
of
the
injury-infact/causation/redressability test set out in Lujan. In 2000, the
Supreme Court held that the citizens’ suit plaintiffs in Friends of the
69
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. did have
Article III standing. The lower court had found “repeatedly,
68. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102-04 (1998). In this
case, the Court emphasized,
[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three requirements. . . .
First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately proven) an ‘injury in fact’ – a
harm suffered by the plaintiff that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical. . . . Second, there must be causation – a fairly traceable connection
between the plaintiff’s injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant . . . And
third, there must be redressability – a likelihood that the requested relief will redress
the alleged injury. This triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes
the core of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence.”
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted.)
The Court held that the plaintiff company could not meet the stringent redressability
requirement on its request for information about toxic releases under a right-to-know statute
because none of the relief requested “would serve to reimburse respondent for losses caused by
the late reporting, or to eliminate any effects of that late reporting upon respondent.” Id. at 10506 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, the plaintiff had no Article III
standing, despite the presence of a citizens’ suit provision in the governing law. See generally
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). The New York Times has noted that the Supreme
Court’s trend of tightening standing requirements was one of the “most profound setbacks for
the environmental movement in decades.” William Glaberson, Novel Antipollution Tool Is
Being Upset by Court, NY TIMES, June 5, 1999, at A1, cited in Adler, supra note 60, at 39.
69. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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Laidlaw’s discharges exceeded the limits set by the permit. In
particular, despite experimenting with several technological fixes,
Laidlaw consistently failed to meet the permit’s stringent 1.3 ppb
(parts per billion) daily average limit on mercury discharges. The
District Court later found that Laidlaw had violated the mercury
70
limits on 489 occasions between 1987 and 1995.” The district court
had found that Friends of the Earth (FOE) had standing, and though
it denied injunctive and declaratory relief, it did issue a civil penalty
against Laidlaw.
However, the district court also explicitly found, despite the
violations, “There has been no demonstrated proof of harm to the
71
environment.” Additionally, the district court found, “[T]he overall
quality of the river exceeds levels necessary to support propagation of
fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and recreation in and on the water. The
fish tissue studies . . . showed levels of mercury in the sampled fish
well below the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) action
72
level . . .”
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, after
assuming without deciding the issue of standing, ordered the case
dismissed for mootness, noting Laidlaw’s subsequent compliance with
73
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
the permits.
finding of mootness because “[a] defendant’s voluntary cessation of
allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does not suffice to moot a
74
case.”
Laidlaw contended that FOE lacked standing because there was
no injury-in-fact. To support their standing claim, the plaintiffs
offered affidavits from local residents. For instance, one residence
claimed that, as a boy, he camped and fished near the river three to
fifteen miles south of Laidlaw’s plant. However, he wouldn’t do that
anymore because “he was concerned that the water was polluted by
75
He also stated that the river looked and
Laidlaw’s discharges.”
smelled polluted. Other residents gave similar statements. For
example, another resident maintained that before Laidlaw came, she
used to walk near the river, wade in, picnic, and bird watch. But “she

70. Id. at 176 (citing the lower court’s decision, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F.Supp. 588, 613-21 (D.S.C. 1997)).
71. Friends of the Earth, 956 F.Supp. at 602.
72. Id. at 600.
73. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 306 n.4
(4th Cir. 1998).
74. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 174.
75. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
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no longer engaged in these activities in or near the river because she
76
was concerned about harmful effects from discharged pollutants.”
The thrust of the injury claimed in these affidavits are the individuals’
subjective apprehensions and fears that Laidlaw’s discharges may be
affecting water quality, despite the lack of scientific support for these
fears.
In spite of this subjective basis for the claim of injury, the
majority, by a 7-2 vote, found that FOE had standing to sue. The
majority held, “The relevant showing for purposes of Article III
standing, however, is not injury to the environment but injury to the
77
plaintiff.” The Court explicitly held, then, that there need be no
injury to the environment to support citizen-suit standing. The
plaintiff’s mere knowledge that a permit was violated, which in turn
resulted in fear and that subjective fear lessened the “aesthetic and
recreational values of the area” for the plaintiff, was enough to grant
78
There was no scientifically supported deterioration in
standing.
water quality and no increased risk of ingestion of chemicals; there
was nothing but the plaintiffs’ subjective fears based on technical
permit violations. These subjective fears, where they impact plaintiffs
activities and enjoyment, are apparently enough to support a finding
of injury-in-fact. As one commentator points out, this is a long way
from the concrete, particularized injury required in Defenders:
79
“‘Injury-in-fact’ became injury in fiction.”
Typically, as Scalia points out in the dissent, the environmental
plaintiff claims that the harm to the environment harmed the plaintiff.
Scalia notes,
. . . harm to the environment is not enough to satisfy the injury-infact requirement unless the plaintiff can demonstrate how he
personally was harmed. In the normal course, however, a lack of
demonstrable harm to the environment will translate, as it plainly
does here, into a lack of demonstrable harm to citizen plaintiffs.
While it is perhaps possible that a plaintiff could be harmed even
though the environment was not, such a plaintiff would have the
burden of articulating and demonstrating the nature of that injury.
Ongoing ‘concerns’ about the environment are not enough, for it is

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 181.
Id. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)).
Adler, supra note 60, at 56.
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the reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the
80
standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions.

The majority, in a sense, turned on its head the typical use of the
claim that it is harm to the plaintiff, and not the environment, that is
relevant to standing. Usually, this means that the harm to the
environment must be severe enough to also have harmed the plaintiff.
But the majority in Laidlaw empties the claim of meaning by holding
that there need be no harm to the environment or threat human
health for the plaintiff to have suffered injury-in-fact due to technical
violation of discharge permits. Subjective fear is enough.
Even though Laidlaw, in one sense, represents a victory for
environmentalists insofar as standing requirements seem to have been
relaxed. Yet it is troubling that the standing doctrine made the wellbeing of the river, in significant measure, irrelevant. It was human
subjective fears about pollution to the river, unmoored from actual
harm to the river or the environment that allowed the court to hear
the case. Insofar as it focuses such exclusive attention on these fears
as its basis for the finding of injury-in-fact, this case illustrates what is
wrong with the standing doctrine from the perspective of the
environmentalist. The environment has been so instrumentalized by
the standing doctrine that harm to the environment can actually be
left entirely out of the picture by the court deciding whether an
environmental plaintiff has standing to sue, ostensibly to engage as
“private attorneys general” to protect the environment. In the Court
portrayal of this case, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that what is
being redressed in this case is not harm to the environment but harm
to the plaintiffs’ psyches caused by their beliefs about the
environment. The environment is merely a stage, a background, on
which the ethically salient, and exclusively human, activity takes
place.
This is not to impugn the integrity of the plaintiffs in this case. It
is to impugn a judicial system that forces plaintiffs to argue in terms
of harm to themselves, when their primary motivation may well be
ethical concern for the well-being of a river, an ecosystem, or other
life. In Laidlaw, plaintiffs should have been free to sue for Laidlaw’s
failure to meet the permit requirements. But such standing should be
understood as the result of a congressional grant of standing, of a
statutory cause of action. The plaintiffs were given a cause of action

80. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations and quotations
omitted).
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by the Clean Water Act’s citizens’ suit provision when Laidlaw
repeatedly failed to meet the requirements of the permit that they
were issued.
Another post-Lujan case that displays the split in the Court, and
the malleability of the standing requirements, is Massachusetts v.
81
EPA. In this case, the Court held that Massachusetts had standing
to sue the EPA for failing to offer a statutorily authorized rationale
for its refusal to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from new vehicles.
The state’s claimed injury was the loss of its shoreline, purportedly
due to the rising sea level caused by global warming. But there was
conflicting testimony in the record on whether subsidence was at least
a partial cause of the shoreline loss. Further, tailpipe emissions of
carbon dioxide in the United States account for only six percent of
the worldwide emissions and new regulations would, realistically, only
marginally impact this small percentage. To claim that the loss of
shoreline is an injury-in-fact caused by the EPA’s failure to regulate
new vehicles’ carbon dioxide emissions seems a bit of a stretch of
these concepts of injury-in-fact and causation. (The majority basically
reasoned that every little bit counts, and big problems have to be
tackled one step at a time.) Chief Justice Roberts claimed in his
dissent, with some justification, that the Court’s decision “recalls the
82
He
previous high-water mark of diluted standing requirements.”
points out the speculative nature of the injury as the injury caused by
83
the failure of the EPA to regulate new vehicle emissions.
But the primary problem is the Court’s doctrine of standing
itself. The divorce of the Article III, and especially the injury-in-fact
requirement, from any statutory cause of action – that is, making
standing an independent threshold question – not only untethers
standing from its historical and constitutional bounds and imposes a
value theory that is highly contested, it is also conceptually untenable
(and results in the “looseness” and “manipulability” that the Chief
Justice refers to). To determine what counts as an injury requires a

81. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
82. Id. at 1470-71. Chief Justice Roberts was referring to the Court’s decision in United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
The Chief Justice continues, “Over time, SCRAP became emblematic not of the looseness of
Article III standing requirements, but of how utterly manipulable they are if not taken seriously
as a matter of judicial self-restraint.” Id. He is entirely right on the manipulability of the
requirements. But what he means by “judicial self-restraint” is less clear. Perhaps he means
continued use of the requirements to advance the conservative justices anti-environmental
agenda.
83. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1470.
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normative framework for determining how something ought to be or
ought to function. In short, what counts as an injury depends on
one’s worldview. It’s a small wonder that standing has become the
locus of powerful ideological differences. What counts as an injury to
a conservative may differ markedly from what counts as an injury to a
liberal precisely because their worldviews, their views of the way the
world ought to be, differ markedly.
In addition to its logical problems, the current standing doctrine
finds little support in either the Constitution or history.
IV. STANDING IN THE
CONSTITUTION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC
Article III of the Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to
84
“Cases” and “Controversies.” The text of the Constitution provides
little guidance on how these terms are to be interpreted. Article III
does not refer to standing or injury-in-fact. Article III requires a case
or controversy, which likely requires some law (either common law or
statute) to provide a cause of action, but any further requirements do
not come from the text of the Constitution.
And history belies the claim that these requirements are deepseated in American jurisprudence. Vindication of the rule of law, the
undifferentiated public interest in the faithful execution of the law,
have long been viewed as the proper province of the citizen plaintiff –
85
contrary to modern standing law. As Louis Jaffe summarized his
historical survey in 1961, “the public action – an action brought by a
private person primarily to vindicate the public interest in the
enforcement of public obligations – has long been a feature of our
86
In 1875, for instance, the Supreme
English and American law.”
Court was presented with a petition for a writ of mandamus (or a
court command) by private citizens to compel a federally chartered
87
railroad to build a railroad line. The Court allowed the action to go
forward even though the Court maintained that the petitioners were

84. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
85. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
86. Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV.
255, 302 (1961).
87. Union Pacific Railroad v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343 (1875). For more detailed analysis, see
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1371, 1404-05 (1987).
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seeking to enforce “a duty to the public generally” and had “no
88
interest other than what belonged to others.”
Congress’ creation of the qui tam action and informers’ action
also undercut the view that Article III bars congressionally
89
authorized citizen actions.
Early Congress created numerous qui
tam statutes, with the purpose of giving citizens the right to bring civil
suits to help enforce criminal law. Under the qui tam action, a citizen
could bring suit against those who violated the law. Many statutes in
the first decade of the nation’s existence allowed for qui tam actions;
these included statutes criminalizing the slave trade with other
90
nations and criminalizing liquor importation without the payment of
91
As the Supreme Court explained in 1905, “[s]tatutes
duties.
providing for actions by a common informer, who himself had no
interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute,
have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this
92
country ever since the foundation of our government.” Similarly,
early Congress created informers’ action, through which private
citizens could bring suit to enforce public duties and keep a share of
the resulting fine or damages. The informers’ action could be applied
93
both against private individuals and public officers.
There is no
evidence in the historical record that anyone harbored any doubts
94
about the constitutionality of what were in essence citizens’ suits.
Of course, both the qui tam action and the informers’ action
generally allowed the plaintiff a monetary award, and in that sense,
differ from modern citizens’ suits. The award of a bounty did not
create an injury where none existed before, but rather served as an
95
incentive to carry out desired action. Further, mandamus suits were
allowed, but did not involve the exchange of money. And the very

88. Union Pacific Railroad, 91 U.S. at 354.
89. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 87, at 1391; Sunstein, supra note 21, 174-76; Winter, supra
note 58, at 156-60. These articles provide further analysis of these actions.
90. Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 347, 349.
91. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 199, 209. See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 175,
for further examples.
92. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905).
93. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Stat. 29, 45.
94. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 175-76.
95. Id. at 176. Of course, Congress could create a bounty, say, of a dollar, for citizen
enforcement of environmental regulations to make the current citizens’ suit equivalent to qui
tam and informers’ action. But such an action would merely show the emptiness, indeed
silliness, of the attempt to maintain a meaningful difference between these early actions and the
modern citizens’ suit provisions.
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fact that no constitutional concerns were voiced about these stranger
suits makes it unlikely that they, as such, were thought to be
constitutionally problematic. Early American law and judicial
practices do not support the claim that there are constitutional limits
on Congress’ authority to establish standing. There is no hint of an
Article III requirement of injury-in-fact in the text or in the historical
record. The Article III requirement of a case or controversy, read in
light of the text of the Constitution as well as constitutional history,
means nothing more than that some source of law must have
conferred a cause of action for a given plaintiff to have standing.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s modern interpretation of its role, and the
place of the doctrine of standing in maintaining that role, cannot
withstand scrutiny. It is not supported by the text of the Constitution,
history, or logic. Further, it is a usurpation of legislative prerogative
and a violation of the separation of powers, rather than a bulwark
against such violation. Perhaps because of the Court’s anxiety to
avoid having to rule on the category of cases represented in Lujan –
those that are brought by plaintiffs who seek to force government
agencies to obey the law – the Court crossed the boundary that
separates the branches of government and made a vastly important
public policy choice. Specifically, the Court imposed a theory of
value on the democratic polity in which human beings are the source
and center of value. At least in those cases where an agency fails to
act, an individual is no longer allowed (1) to step forward and sue on
behalf of an ecosystem or species that is injured (2) by activity that is
prohibited by statute (3) even when that statute also grants citizen
standing, (4) unless that individual can demonstrate that she herself is
injured by the activity. And it is this injury to the human individual
that is judicially cognizable, and would likely be redressed by a
favorable ruling. The natural environment and other life become a
mere backdrop for playing out of the human drama.
The Supreme Court’s development of the injury-in-fact
requirement for standing highlights this aspect of the value theory
espoused by the Court: the Court endorses an anthropocentric value
theory insofar as it is only injuries to human beings that “count.”
This may be a viable value theory. This may the value theory
that we, the people, would choose. But it is not a value theory that is
mandated by the U.S. Constitution and it is not within the purview of
the courts in a democratic polity, by any reasonable view of the role
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of the courts, to force on the nation. Far from being a bulwark to
protect the separation of powers, the Supreme Court has employed
the doctrine of standing to break down that separation and usurp the
prerogatives of the legislative branch.
The severing of injury-in-fact from legal injury transformed the
court’s legal inquiry not into simple factual inquiry but rather into an
extraordinarily complex metaphysical inquiry – an inquiry into the
ultimate and more general nature of entities. If we consider the
notion of legal interest, then what counts as a legal interest and a legal
injury can be clarified. If the U.S. government drains the wetlands on
federal lands, an individual does not, by that action alone, have a
legal interest; consequently, that individual has no standing and there
is no Article III case or controversy. If, however, Congress passes a
statute granting citizens standing to sue their government in order to
protect wetlands, then Congress has granted a cause of action – a
beneficial interest in wetlands and the legal right to sue for their
protection.
Congress, by creating a cause of action to complain against
environmental destruction or racial discrimination, is granting
individuals a legal interest in a certain state of affairs (say, clean air,
or thriving species, or racial equality). It is this legal interest by which
courts judge if there is a cause of action, and so standing and an
Article III “case” or “controversy.” Severing the standing inquiry
from the inquiry into whether there is legal interest was the primary
wrong turn that has allowed the Supreme Court to use the standing
doctrine for ideological purposes – both conservative (staunch, strict
inquiry into injury-in-fact) and liberal (loose, diluted inquiry into
injury-in-fact).
To move the Court out of the policy-making arena, the current
doctrine of standing should be jettisoned for a more structured,
predictable, and less ideologically driven inquiry into whether the
plaintiff presents a cause of action. Such a development would take
the courts out of the business of imposing a contested value theory on
the democratic polity and restore the proper balance between the
branches of government.

